(This is the full version of a letter sent to the editor of
Rolling Stone magazine in response to their article, The Fear Factory which
appeared in the February 7, 2008 edition.) Rolling Stone printed an edited
version to comport with their word limitations, in the February 22, 2008
issue.
There is an old saying among reporters: The worst thing you
can do to a good story is check it out. Guy Lawson ("The Fear
Factory" Rolling Stone, February 7th) brings hypothetical
theory to new heights. After "checking it out," Mr. Lawson simply
tailored his story around any compelling facts that did not fit his original
premise. Before coming to the FBI, over 25 years ago, I won most of the major
awards that they give to a reporter. I feel I have standing to say that a
journalist has an obligation to tell at least two sides of a story. Your
readers only got one.
The premise to which Mr. Lawson's story was married is his
theory that the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task
Forces (JTTFs) have to justify their existence in the post 9/11 world
by ginning up thin cases against arguably docile suspects who have neither the
intent nor capability to cause real harm. Mr. Lawson deftly skips over 27 years
of the work of the JTTFs capturing al Qaeda suspects from the first World Trade
Center bombing, preventing the attacks on New York landmarks, the Embassy and
USS Cole bombings, the Millennium Plot and more. Instead, Mr. Lawson narrowed
his focus to cases involving small groups and "lone wolves" that planned to
murder American citizens on U.S. soil.
Derrick Shareef, the convicted terrorist at
the center of the story who Mr. Lawson frivolously described as being a
"wanna-be jihadi," possessed all of the traits necessary to harm or kill
innocent citizens. Investigators were also keenly aware of Mr. Shareef's
continuous contacts with Hassan Abujihaad, another domestic terror suspect
being monitored by the FBI. Mr. Abujihaad was indicted for
sending classified e-mails while serving on a U.S. Navy ship to pro-Taliban
forces, divulging his naval battle group's operational vulnerabilities. It was
only after the two had a falling out that Mr. Shareef accelerated his plans to
act independently and swiftly to launch an attack. The JTTF took correct action
to disrupt his plans and arrest him.
Mr. Shareef, like scores of suicide bombers overseas, was
infused with a poisonous ideology, displayed a single-minded desire to take
action, regularly declared his intent to kill, and sought to obtain weapons to
commit an attack.
One needs only to reflect on the example of Timothy McVeigh,
who murdered 168 U.S. citizens in the Oklahoma City bombing.
Mr. McVeigh could have been described as having little money, working a dead
end job as a security guard, dealing with anger issues, and devoted to an
extremist ideology. Like Mr. Shareef, Mr. McVeigh discussed his plans with
others, cased potential targets, took action to secure explosives for the
operation, and tried to do it as cheaply as possible.
Other killers have started out with even less. Take John Allan
Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, the "D.C. Snipers." Two practically homeless men,
living out of a car, filled with hate and armed with a high-powered assault
rifle. As in the case of Mr. Shareef, you might be tempted to call them
"losers," but their actions paralyzed greater Washington D.C. for three weeks
in 2002. In the end, 10 people died in the attacks and still others were
identified from earlier shootings in other states. None of these men would have
met Mr. Lawson's standard as being a legitimate threat, yet had the
FBI known about them before they struck, we would have been
severely criticized.
At any point during his planning process, Mr. Shareef could
have stopped his actions, but he chose not to. There is no evidence that he
ever wavered in his desire to murder holiday shoppers in the CherryVale Mall
that day. Would he have succeeded had it not been for the
diligence of the JTTF? Mr. Lawson's story suggests we should
be willing to take this gamble, but he is not responsible for the outcome. No
one will knock on the doors of Rolling Stone and ask why
people died that day.
Not every terrorist needs to be linked to an
organized group like al Qaeda to kill the innocent. What these lessons have
taught us is that if the motivation is strong enough, challenges such as
getting weapons or paying for the operation can be overcome.
JTTF agents and officers abide by
FBI procedures, Department of Justice legal guidance, and the
United States Constitution. They must bring facts before a judge to get
authorization for a warrant or electronic surveillance. Since 9/11, the JTTFs
have broken a dozen plots targeting civilians on U.S. soil. None of them have
been well-financed, but I cannot remember any victim of a terrorist attack
lamenting that they wished they'd been killed by a more expensive plot.
Mr. Lawson's sweeping statement, "The defendants posed little
if any demonstrable threat to anyone or anything," seems to be his uneducated
guess rather than an objective summary of the legal outcomes or courtroom
results. In almost every case heard by a jury, the defendants were found
guilty, in spite of having some dedicated and talented defense lawyers
articulate the same claims Mr. Lawson has swallowed. The
Yassin Aref case in Albany, New York, and the Hamid Hayat case in Lodi,
California, are two examples. In other cases such as the "Lackawanna Six," and
the Torrance cell, the defendants pled guilty with the advice of counsel.
If we have identified somebody with the intent to take lives
in the name of extremism and we fail to take the appropriate
action, we are ignoring our sworn mission to protect the innocent. Regardless
of criticism, it is our obligation to err on the side of safety while
continuing to adhere to Constitutional protections.
John J. Miller
Assistant Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
